Environmental Economics II: Mechanisms (5 cr)

Code:
AGERE-E02
Field:
Environmental Economics
Targets:
Master’s students Research Master's students PhD students
Organiser:
University of Helsinki - Environmental Economics
Instructor:
Lassi Ahlvik
Period:
Period 3
Format:
Lecture
Method:
Contact teaching
Venue:
Viikki campus
Enrollment:

In case of conflicting information consider the Sisu/Course/Moodle pages the primary source of information.

Aalto, Hanken and UH economics students can enroll through their home university’s SISU. Further instructions are available on the How to enroll? page, also for students from other universities.

If you would like to count the credits towards your degree, please check your curriculum or contact your supervisor or student services for guidance.

  • To access the Moodle course area, use all the features and participate in the activities (assignments, discussions), you must have successfully registered for the course in Sisu and logged in with your UH user ID.

  • For more information on how to activate your UH user ID and register for a Moodle course area, click here.

The course deepens the theory and analytical skills provided by course AGERE-E01. The first part of the course focuses on economics of uncertainty and introduces the concepts of risk-aversion, prudence, value of information, precautionary principle and optimal experimentation. The second part of the course introduces economics of information, where the policy maker is less informed than the regulated firms or individuals. We learn how to design contracts, negotiations, green auctions and mechanisms under information constraints. Throughout the course, we will supplement the theoretical models with numerical examples and empirical studies.

After completing the course, the students understand how to systematically think the solution to environmental problems under uncertainty, and how to design incentive schemes for effective environmental problem under private information. The students will learn to formulate, analyze and interpret economic models of uncertainty and private information, such as moral hazard, adverse selection, auctions and mechanism design.