August 13, 2019
On August 16th, doctoral candidate Michele Crescenzi will defend his doctoral thesis “Essays on Information and Knowledge in Game Theory”. The thesis is a theoretical analysis of how information and knowledge affect strategic interactions.
Crescenzi’s work contributes to the literature on microeconomic theory. He examines three issues. First, he shows that the standard assumptions of rationality and common knowledge have powerful implications on how information is shared. More specifically, rational players will always end up sharing the private information they have, provided that they can communicate with each other. Second, Crescenzi studies strategic behavior when information is imprecise due to ambiguity in natural language. It turns out that such an ambiguity provides a natural device that players can use to coordinate their strategic decisions. Finally, he focuses on the strategic motives to manipulate information. He shows that there is less incentive to distort information when strategic decisions are made under uncertainty.