Microeconomics

Michele Lombardi (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow)

  • Mechanism design with farsighted agents (with Ville Korpela)

  • Home page: Michele Lombardi
  • Download Draft: Here
  • Location:
     Economicum building, seminar room 3-4
  • Address:
    Helsinki, Arkadiankatu 7
Organizers
KK
Klaus Kultti

University of Helsinki

klaus.kultti at helsinki.fi

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